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I. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by the
Rome Statute' to prosecute and adjudicate alleged violations of the
Statute, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.2 The
ICC applies a jurisdictional rule known as the rule of
complementarity. Under this rule, the ICC may not prosecute a
case that is prosecuted by a state.4 This jurisdictional rule is a
marked departure from that of other international criminal
tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), that have adopted a so-called rule of primacy
that enables them to prosecute cases even if they are investigated
or prosecuted by a state.s Complementarity was adopted because
the drafters of the statute thought that it would create better
incentives for states to prosecute crimes in their own national
courts and thereby increase deterrence. 6
Complementarity,
however, allows states to prevent prosecution in the ICC by trying
their officers in sham trials that may lead to false acquittals or light
sentences, decreasing the deterrent impact of the rule. Although
the Rome Statute allows the ICC to expose trials as shams and
apply its jurisdiction, doing so is often impossible.8 This paper
evaluates the impact of complementarity on deterring war crimes
committed by a country's army officers.
It suggests that
deterrence is driven not only by the proportion of rule-of-law
states and corrupt states, as the prior literature suggested, but also,
and even more importantly, by the likelihood that the ICC itself

I Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2 Id. at arts. 4-8.
3 Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of
Humanitarianlaw Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AMER. J. INT'L L. 394, 405 (1999).
4 Id. at 405.
5 See id. at 405.

6 See id.
7 See Jann K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National
Criminal Jurisdictions 53-55 (2008).
8 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17; see also Mark S. Ellis, The
International Criminal Court and its Implication for Domestic Law and National
Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215, 237 (2002) (describing the criteria that goes
into determining the admissibility of a case).
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will prosecute officers.9
The theory is simple: when the
probability of prosecution by the ICC is too low to deter officers,
officers in rule-of-law states would be deterred only when the state
has an incentive to prosecute its officers under a complementarity
system. Officers in corrupt states would not be deterred under
complementarity or under primacy because the rule of
complementarity's objective-namely, inducing states to take
responsibility for the prosecution of war crimes-would be
defeated by the corrupt states' use of sham trials. In contrast,
when the probability of prosecution is sufficiently high, officers in
rule-of-law states will be deterred both under complementarity and
under primacy because their states will prosecute them
legitimately, and they can expect a high probability of prosecution
by the ICC. Officers in corrupt states will be deterred only under
primacy, which prevents their states from shielding them from ICC
prosecution via sham trials. This suggests that, if (as the drafters
of the Rome Statute envisioned) the probability of ICC
prosecution increases over time, the probability of prosecution
could reach a point where primacy will better deter officers from
committing war crimes than complementarity.
Part II briefly describes the ICC and the Rome Statute. Part III
discusses the conditions under which complementarity can lead to
better deterrence than primacy. Part IV analyzes the preferable
rule conditioned on the ICC's ability or inability to detect sham
trials. Part V suggests different normative solutions intended to
maximize deterrence. Part VI concludes.
II. The International Criminal Court
The ICC is an independent, permanent, treaty-based,
international court located at The Hague in the Netherlands.'o It
began operating on July 1, 2002," and is the first permanent

9

See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 404-05.

10 Although the ICC cooperates with the United Nations, it is an independent

judicial institution. See International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties Res. 1,
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the
United Nations, 3d Sess., at arts. 2-3 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-5AA9B6DI E96C/0/ICCASP3
ReslEnglish.pdf.
II The Rome Statute was adopted by 120 states in July 1998 and was entered into
force on July 1, 2002, after its ratification by 60 states. See About the Court, INT'L CRIM.
CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (follow "About the Court"
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international court to have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals
who have engaged in the most severe international crimes,
including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.' 2
Today, 122 states are parties to the Rome Statute (state parties).13
These include highly developed western democracies, as well as
developing states.
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over
crimes that were allegedly committed in the territory, or by a
national of a state party.1 It can also exercise jurisdiction over
crimes committed in a non-party state if that state accepted its
jurisdiction regarding a specific situation, or if the Security
Council refers the situation to it. 6
The ICC's independent prosecutor may initiate investigations
on her own accord. '7 In addition, state parties and the Security

hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). Additionally, the ICC may only prosecute crimes
committed after the Rome Statute entered into force. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at
arts. 11, 24.
12 The crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction are listed in Article 5 of the Rome
Statute. It states that the ICC's jurisdiction "shall be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole." Rome Statute, supra note 1, at
art. 5(1). The court has jurisdiction over the four following crimes: the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Id., at art.
5(1)(a(d). The first three crimes are defined under Articles 6-8. Article 5, however,
states that the court will only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision defining aggression and setting the conditions for its prosecution is adopted in
an amendment to the Statute. Id. at art. 5(2). On June 11, 2010, Resolution RC/Res.6
was adopted by a plenary meeting, which adopted a definition of the crime of aggression.
The ICC will be able to exercise jurisdiction over this crime only if (1) thirty states
accept the amendment and (2) the state parties decide to amend the Rome Statute after
January 1, 2017, in the regular amendment process, which requires a two thirds majority
of state parties. Id. at art. 121; see Amendments to the Rome Statue of the International
Criminal Court, Res. RC/Res.6, Jun. I1, 2010, available at, https:/treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/CN/201 0/CN.651.201 0-Eng.pdf.
13 See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/Pages/asp home.aspx (follow "State Parties to the Rome Statute"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
14 See id. Several states signed the Rome Statute but did not ratify it and are thus
not state parties to the Statute. Notably, the Unites States signed the treaty but
communicated its intention not to ratify the treaty and not to become a state party. See
also Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Declarations and Reservations (containing the
various objections made by signatories).
15 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12.
16 Id. at arts. 12-13.
17 Id. at art. 15.
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Council may refer situations to the prosecutor for investigation.' 8
When the prosecutor determines that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with the investigation, she must seek authorization to
continue from a pre-trial chamber of the ICC.19 The pre-trial
chamber has the authority to issue arrest warrants and pre-trial
summons.
After the accused appears before the ICC, the pretrial chamber holds a hearing to confirm the charges against him; a
similar hearing can be held in the absence of the accused if he fled
or waived his right to be present. 21 Once the charges are
confirmed, a trial is held in front of a three-judge trial chamber
that decides whether to convict or acquit.2 2 Although trial
chambers are encouraged to attempt to reach unanimous decisions,
a simple majority can reach a binding verdict. 23 If a person is
convicted, he may be subject to a penalty of up to thirty years
imprisonment or a penalty of life imprisonment, if justified by the
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances. 24
The prosecutor and the convicted individual each have the right to
appeal the judgment to an appeals chamber composed of the
18 Id. at arts. 13-15. The prosecutor can be informed of crimes by communications.
See
Preliminary
Examinations,
INT'L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.icccpi.int/EN Menus/ICC/Pages/default.aspx (follow "Structure of the Court" hyperlink;
then follow "Office of the Prosecutor" hyperlink; then follow "Preliminary
Examinations" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
Thousands of such
communications were submitted with a majority of those communications coming from
individuals in the US, UK, Germany, Russia and France. Id. When the prosecutor
receives a communication, she shall not initiate an investigation unless she finds a
reasonable basis to proceed. Id. When the prosecutor receives a referral, she shall
initiate a prosecution unless she finds no reasonable basis to proceed according to article
53 to the Rome Statute. Id. Therefore the default procedure is different depending on
whether there is a communication or a referral. Id.
19 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15(3)-(4).
20 Id. at art. 58.
21 Id. at art. 61.

Id. at art. 39.
The court will issue a reasoned, written single decision, in case there is no
unanimity the decision will contain the views of the majority and the minority. See id. at
art. 74.
24 Id. at art. 77, para. 1. According to Article 77, paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute,
the court can order, in addition to imprisonment, a fine or a forfeiture of assets derived
from the crime. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77, para. 2. According to the Rome
Statute, when the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the case of
life imprisonment, the court shall review the sentence, and may decide to reduce it due to
the cooperation of the person with the court or a clear and significant change of
circumstances. Id. at art. I10.
22
23
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president of the ICC and four other members of the appeals
*- -

division. 25

Many procedures were put in place to ensure the independence
of the prosecutor and the judges in the ICC from pressures of state
parties. 26 So far, the ICC has convicted only two people,227 has

Id. supra note 1, at arts. 39, 81-85.
For instance, no two judges may be nationals of the same state. Id. at art. 36,
para.. 7. Also, the judges should represent the main legal systems of the world and afford
an equitable geographic representation. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 36, para. 8.
The judges are independent and may not engage in any activity that can jeopardize their
independence. Id. at art. 40. There shall be eighteen judges in the ICC, unless the
assembly of state parties decides to increase this number. Id. at art. 36, para. 1. The
judges are elected by a secret ballot at a meeting of the assembly of state parties. Id. at
art. 36, para. 6(a). The judges elected will be those that receive most of the votes and at
least two thirds of the votes of state parties that voted. Id. For each election, every state
can submit a candidate, who must be a national of a state party, although not necessarily
of that state. Id. at art. 36, para. 4(b). Besides the first election or judges elected to fill a
vacancy, judges shall hold office for nine years and are not eligible for re-election. Id. at
art. 36, para. 9(b). The prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute
majority of the members of the assembly of state parties. Id. at art. 42, para. 4. A deputy
prosecutor shall be elected in a similar way from a list of three candidates submitted by
the prosecutor. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 42, para 4. Unless elected for a shorter
time, the prosecutor and deputy prosecutor shall hold office for nine years and shall not
be eligible for re-election. Id. The prosecutor and the deputy prosecutor shall not
engage in any activity that might jeopardize their independence and will be disqualified
from addressing any case in the court where their impartiality may be doubted. Id. at art.
42, para. 7: The ICC is funded by contributions from the State Parties, the amounts of
which are assessed according to an agreed upon scale, similar to the one used by the
United Nations for its regular budget, with the necessary adjustments. Id. at art. 115(a).
It can also receive funds from the United Nations, if they are approved by the General
Assembly, particularly due to expenses incurred due to referrals from the Security
Council. Id. at art. 115(b). The ICC can also obtain voluntary contributions from
different entities such as governments, international organizations, individuals or
corporations. Id. at art. 116. Christian Wenaweser, the president of the Assembly of
State Parties of the International Criminal Court, claimed in an interview that despite the
high costs of investigations generated by referrals from the Security Council, the State
Parties of the ICC currently bear the entire financial burden for these situations. See Jos6
Domingo Guariglia, Q&A: Budget Woes Could Hamper ICC Investigations, INTERPRESS
SERVICE (Jul. 25, 2011), http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/07/qa-budget-woes-couldhamper-icc-investigations/ . The ten State Parties that are the largest contributors to the
ICC's budget are: Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain,
Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Australia. See id. The ICC's budget for the year
2011 was 103,607,900 Euro.
See I.C.C. Res. ICC-ASP/9/Res.4, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-9-Res.4-ENG.pdf.
27 The only two persons convicted were Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Germain
Katanga. Lubanga was convicted on March 14, 2012, for committing the war crimes of
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate
25

26
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summoned or issued arrest warrants against thirty-six people,2 8
and has investigated only eight situations, all of them in African
countries. 29 Therefore, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions
about the nature of the ICC's decision making and its deterrent
effect, based on its short history. However, it is possible to
theorize about the deterrent effects of different jurisdictional rules
based on standard assumptions about the incentives of states and
army officers, as this paper does.
III. The Rule That Promotes Better Deterrence
A. The Theory
Before the deterrent effects of complementarity and primacy
are analyzed, it is useful to highlight their differences. Under
complementarity, an international court may not prosecute an
officer if 1) he is currently being investigated or prosecuted
legitimately by a state, 2) the state decided not to prosecute after it
legitimately investigated him,30 or 3) a national court decided the
case legitimately.31 If, however, the state did not investigate the
actively in hostilities. On July 10, 2012, Lubanga was sentenced to fourteen years of
imprisonment. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01104-01/06,
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.intlenmenus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/demo
cratic%20republic%200f/o20the%20congo.aspx.
On March 7, 2014, Katanga was
convicted of a crime against humanity and four counts of war crimes committed during
an attack on a village, and he was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment on May 23,
2014. See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case. No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (Mar. 7,
2014),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/enmenus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/
situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200107/Pages/democratic%20r
epublic%200f/o20the%20congo.aspx.
28 See All Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases/cases/Pages/cases%20index.aspx/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
29 Four investigations were initiated by self-referrals, situations in which the state
invited the court to prosecute crimes committed in its own territory, specifically, Uganda,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Mali. See
Situations and Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/
situations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Aug. 10,
2014). Two were initiated by Security Council referrals in Darfur, Sudan and in Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya. See id. Investigation into the situation in Kenya was initiated by the
prosecutor of the ICC himself. See id. The prosecutor opened an investigation into the
situation in C6te d'Ivoire following an acceptance of jurisdiction by this state that is not
a party to the Rome Statute. See id.
30 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(a-b).
31 Id. at art. 20, para. 3 (stating that the ICC may not hear a case that was decided
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officer at all, or if it conducted a sham investigation, prosecution
or trial, the ICC may prosecute the officer. 32 Under primacy, an
international court has the authority to formally request that the
state defer to its own jurisdiction if an officer is being investigated
or prosecuted by the state, even if the national court is trying
him.33 Furthermore, the international court is prohibited from
prosecuting the officer only if a state held a legitimate trial. 34
by another court in an independent and impartial trial that was not calculated to prevent
the decision from reaching the ICC).
32 The ICC may declare that an investigation, prosecution, or trial was a sham if it
finds the state unwilling or unable to prosecute the suspected officer. The ICC will deem
a state unwilling to prosecute if the state's actions were meant to shield the officer from
ICC jurisdiction, if there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings, or if the
proceedings were not conducted independently and impartially in a way intended to
bring the officer to justice. The ICC will find a state unable to carry out the prosecution,
if it does not have a judicial system that is able to legitimately adjudicate. Id. at art. 17;
see also Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implication for
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215, 235-39 (2002)
(defining "inability" or "unwillingness to prosecute" and analyzing the ways to
determine them).
33 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia,
art. 9 (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20
Library/Statute/statute-sept09_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. Even if a rule of
primacy is adopted, the ICC prosecutor may theoretically be more likely to prosecute
cases that did not lead to national proceedings in order to prevent violations from being
completely ignored. On the other hand, the prosecutor may theoretically be more likely
to intervene if national proceedings started, since those proceedings expose information
that makes it is easier for the ICC to prosecute it. Neither of these conflicting
possibilities will not be discussed in this paper.
34 According the ICTY Statute, the ICTY will prosecute a person after a trial by the
national court was completed only if the act of which he was accused was characterized
as an ordinary crime (as opposed to an international crime), if the national proceedings
were not impartial or independent, designed to shield the accused from international
criminal responsibility, or if the case was not diligently prosecuted. See id. at art. 10,
para. 2. If it decides to exercise jurisdiction, the ICTY will take into account penalties
that were served for the same crimes following the national court decision. See id. at art.
10, para. 3. The Rome Statute, by comparison, does not demand that the person would
be convicted of an international crime, and not of an ordinary crime, in order to prevent
the ICC from hearing the case. See Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 20, para. 3. Heller
shows that previous drafts of the Rome Statute included a provision that allowed the ICC
to exercise jurisdiction if the crime that was decided by the national court was an
ordinary crime, but the final version of the Rome Statute does not include such a
provision. See Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53
HARV. INT'L L.J. 85, 93 (2012). Heller also shows that prosecuting crimes as
international crimes is particularly difficult, especially for developing states, because of
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It is possible to examine which jurisdictional rule,
complementarity or primacy, better deters officers of states under
the ICC's jurisdiction from committing crimes contrary to the
Rome Statute.35 States under the ICC's jurisdiction may be
involved in wars or armed conflicts. In some cases, officers of the
state may commit crimes contrary to the Rome Statute in an effort
to either reduce the risk to themselves or their soldiers, or to
increase the likelihood of fulfilling their military objectives."Such
crimes may include: willful killing, torture, and taking of

hostages. 37
It may be politically difficult for the state to prosecute officers
who commit war crimes, since such prosecution may damage the
morale of the domestic public and generate public opposition. On
the other hand, the state may benefit from prosecuting its officers,
as such prosecution can potentially improve military discipline,

the need to legislate incorporating legislation. Id. at 94-95. It is also difficult because
international crimes are harder to prove and to investigate. Id. at 100-03. The
requirement of conviction as an international crime therefore presents another significant
obstacle to preventing admissibility to the ICTY. Heller recommends that judgments of
national courts should prevent prosecution in the ICC if their sentence is as severe as the
expected sentence in the ICC. If the person is not tried for the same conduct, this may
raise problems with the rules set in Article 20(3) to the Rome Statute. Heller suggests
that as a matter of policy even such a national sentence should delay the surrender of
persons to the ICC until they served their national sentence. See id. at 130.
35 Deterrence is a primary objective of constructing the ICC.
See THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN

THE 21ST CENTURY 13 (Mark S. Ellis & Richard J. Goldstone eds. 2008). There are
serious doubts, however, about the ability of international tribunals to deter crimes, and
many believe that deterrence works only in the very long term. See Frederic Megret,
Why Would States Want to Join the ICC? A TheoreticalExploration Based on the Legal
Nature of Complementarity, in COMPLEMENTARY VIEWS ON COMPLEMENTARITY 1, 19
n. 18 (Jann K. Kleffner & Gerben Kor eds., 2006); see also Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do
International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 783 (2006) (arguing that under some conditions prosecutions by
international criminal tribunals can fail to deter criminals and may actually lead to the
commission of more severe crimes). There may be other purposes of the ICC that are
not discussed in this paper. Those purposes may include: a just retribution of criminals,
an expressive educational function, and improving international cooperation. This paper
only investigates the rule that maximizes deterrence generally and does not consider the
importance of deterring specific kinds of crimes more than others.
36 See, e.g., Katanga, Case. No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (prosecuting Katanga for
carrying out military objectives by leading a resistance force to attack civilian
populations).
37 Such war crimes are forbidden. Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 8.
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promote the chances of peace and increase the legitimacy of the
state in world public opinion. In some cases, the benefits to the
state from prosecuting a crime that was already committed
outweigh the costs, regardless of the possibility of ICC
prosecution. In those cases, the state would prosecute the crimes
regardless of the jurisdictional rule adopted by the ICC. In other
cases, the costs of prosecuting a crime that was already committed
outweigh the benefits. In those cases, the jurisdictional rule
adopted by the ICC may affect the decision of the state whether to
prosecute, and consequently, whether the state's officers are
deterred.
It is useful to divide the states under the ICC's jurisdiction to
two types: rule of law states and corrupt states.3 ' Rule of law
38 The state may not want to deter some of the crimes that it has an interest in not
prosecuting once they were committed. Those crimes may actually aid the state in
achieving its military objectives. If such crimes are deterred by the ICC, this damages the
state's interest, which may indicate the state received some other benefit that gave it the
incentive to join the ICC in the first place. Some of the crimes that the state has an
interest in not prosecuting once they are committed, however, are crimes the state wants
to deter. The state would be better off if the crimes were not committed in the first place,
because the crime damages the state's international reputation or the chances for peace.
Some states cannot commit by themselves to prosecuting this type of crimes because
once the crimes were committed the state has an interest not to prosecute them. Such
states can use the ICC as a mechanism of commitment, of tying their own hands. The
ICC can give the state an incentive to prosecute the crime even after it was committed, in
order to avoid a decision by the ICC that can damage its reputation. Because the ICC
commits the state to prosecute the crime officers will be deterred from committing this
crime in the first place and thus serve the state's interest. See Beth A. Simmons &
Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court, 64 Int'l
Org. 225, 234 (2010) (arguing that states join the ICC in order to commit credibly not to
use atrocities in civil wars; this commitment signals the government's decision not to use
unlimited violence and may result in a reduction of violence by opponents of the
government); Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal
Court, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 499, 506 (2009). (claiming that the findings of Simmons and
Danner that the ICC is joined primarily.by autocracies that are involved in wars
and by peaceful democracies can also be explained by the fact that states join the ICC
in order to ensure prosecution of rebels or opponents and not only as an attempt of the
state to tie the hands of its own officers; the principle of complementarity allows the state
a way to avoid prosecution by the ICC, which reduces the threat on government officials,
and makes the argument that the ICC is meant especially to deter rebels more likely).
39 Simmons and Danner define democracies as rule of law states that are
committed both to a legitimate trial and investigation when an investigation is initiated,
and to the investigation of every crime. See Simmons & Danner, supra note 38, at 238.
In these democracies, internal measures of accountability prevent all crimes regardless of
the ICC. See id. They define nondemocarcies as either corrupt states or rule of law states
that need the ICC to commit to domestically investigate crimes. They show that both
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states have well-functioning judicial systems. If their police and
prosecution investigate an officer, they will usually investigate and
prosecute him legitimately and their national courts will usually
conduct legitimate trials.o In those rule of law states that
investigate every crime committed by their officers, the ICC's
jurisdictional rule will not affect deterrence since officers will
always be deterred by the threat of national prosecution. In those
rule of law states where the executive may decide not to initiate an
investigation at all into a crime that was committed by the state's
officers, the ICC's jurisdictional rule may affect the executive's
decision whether to investigate or not. In corrupt states, the
judiciary may depend on the executive in ways that compromise
its impartiality. 4 ' Political pressures can compel the judiciary to
conduct sham trials to suit varying political interests.4 2 If an
officer is subject to a sham trial, the trial may be unnecessarily
delayed, the officer may be falsely acquitted, or he may receive a
very light sentence.4 3 In those instances, the officer will not be
deterred from committing the crime.
Complementarity gives states an incentive to investigate their
own officers.4 4 This incentive arises because if a state does not
investigate its officers, then the ICC may assume jurisdiction and
prosecute the officers, which will damage the state's reputation. 45
If the state investigates its officers, the ICC will not be able to

democracies with no recent history of civil war and nondemocracies, with recent civil
war experiences have increased chances of joining the ICC. See id at 240. This suggests
that both types of states discussed in this paper (rule of law states and corrupt states) are
currently under the ICC jurisdiction.
40 Even rule of law states may conduct sham investigations, prosecutions or trials in
some rare cases. The likelihood of sham proceedings in rule of law states is small
enough, however, that if an officer knows he will be investigated this will deter him from
committing the crime. Corrupt states may sometimes conduct legitimate trials but the
likelihood that their trials will be a sham is so high that officers will not be deterred even
if they know their state will investigate them.
41 See Simmons & Danner, supranote 38, at 237.
42 See Kleffner, supra note 7, at 54
43 See id. at 48-55.
44 See id. at 320 (arguing that under complementarity, as opposed to primacy, the
ICC must find that the state is unable or unwilling to prosecute its officers before it
exercises jurisdiction and that a declaration of unwillingness to prosecute may have an
added negative reputational effect on the state, besides the finding of violation itself
which gives the state an additional incentive to prosecute under complementarity).
45 Id.
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assume jurisdiction unless it proves that the investigation was a
sham.4 6 Under complementarity, rule of law states will therefore
investigate their officers. Rule of law states that begin an
investigation of their officers will conduct a legitimate
investigation and prosecution. A national court will try the
officers and will issue appropriate punishments. Officers will
therefore be deterred from committing crimes.4 7 Even if the
officer is not investigated, prosecuted, or tried by his own state, he
may still face prosecution by the ICC.4 8 Under primacy, however,
the state may lack an incentive to investigate or prosecute its own
officers because these actions will not prevent prosecution by the
ICC. 49 Thus, only the prospect of prosecution by the ICC can
deter officers, and if the probability of prosecution by the ICC is
too low, those officers will not be deterred. 50 Therefore, in rule of
See Ellis, supra note 32.
47 This analysis applies if the state is able to prosecute every officer that it has an
interest in prosecuting, unlike the ICC that is able to prosecute only a limited number of
officers. This is usually true because the state has better information and better resources
to address crimes committed by its own nationals than the ICC.
48 Once the ICC starts to investigate a situation, only an investigation by the state of
the same person regarding the same conduct can prevent the ICC from prosecuting him.
See infra note 57. The probability of prosecution by the ICC may actually be higher
under complementarity, since this rule gives all states an incentive to prosecute their own
officers and thus frees resources for the ICC which can increase the probability of
prosecution elsewhere.
49 Even under primacy, if a trial is concluded for an international crime, this will
prevent the ICC from assuming jurisdiction over the case. See Heller, supra note 35.
This may theoretically give states an interest to conclude the trial more quickly under
primacy. This possibility is not discussed here since it will be much more difficult to
conclude a trial, especially for an international crime, before the ICC can assume
jurisdiction compared to starting an investigation or prosecution that is enough to prevent
ICC prosecution under complementarity. If a state can consider the behavior of future
officers and change its behavior accordingly, by credibly committing to prosecute
officers even when it goes against its interest to do so, this analysis may change. Under
these conditions, situations may occur when a state may actually have a greater incentive
to prosecute under primacy in order to deter future officers from committing crimes
because under primacy, future officers that commit crimes will be prosecuted by the ICC
and the state will not be able to prevent this by prosecuting them itself, as it can do under
complementarity.
50 In theory, officers may face a trial by foreign courts under Universal Jurisdiction.
Universal Jurisdiction allows any state to prosecute the core international crimes such as
crimes against humanity and war crimes, even without any territorial or national link of
the state to the crime itself. See Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal
Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the TransnationalProsecution of International
Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2011). Many crimes that can be prosecuted under
46
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law states, complementarity leads to either better, or equal,
deterrence compared with primacy.
In corrupt states, complementarity gives the state an incentive
to prosecute its officers, but officers may be tried in sham trials,
and will therefore not be deterred. Sham trials will shield the
officers from the ICC and prevent the ICC from deterring the
officers. The ICC is theoretically allowed to expose national trials
as shams and to exercise jurisdiction despite those trials. 5' If sham
trials can always be exposed, complementarity clearly deters more
officers since no state will use sham trials. In practice, however, it
is often impossible to expose sham trials, both because the ICC
will need to acquire hidden information to prove the trial is a sham
and because exposing the trial as a sham brands the state as a
cheater and may lead to harsh resistance to the ICC..52 This
Universal Jurisdiction are also covered by the ICC's jurisdiction. Prosecution of foreign
nationals under Universal Jurisdiction, however, was shown to be very unlikely when the
state of nationality opposes it. See id. at 9. Langer shows that most of the defendants
tried under Universal Jurisdiction were not defended by their state of nationality, and the
international community broadly agreed to their prosecution. See id. Of the thirty-two
defendants brought to trial under Universal Jurisdiction worldwide, twenty-four have
been from Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and Nazi Germany. See id. Even officers whose
prosecution would not raise political resistance by their states are very unlikely to face
conviction and severe punishment by the tool of Universal Jurisdiction. See id. at 47-48.
They will, therefore, probably not to be deterred by the prospect of such prosecution.
See id. According to Article 20(2) to the Rome Statute, no person shall be tried by
another court for a crime for which he was acquitted or convicted by the ICC. Rome
Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(2). Similarly, according to Article 10(1) of the ICTY
Statute, a national court cannot retry a person tried by the ICTY. Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 10(1), U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY]. Therefore, a trial before the
ICC can theoretically prevent a trial before another court under Universal Jurisdiction.
Supporters of the ICC raised the argument that joining its jurisdiction should not be
feared because prosecution by the ICC may actually prove preferable to prosecution by a
foreign court under Universal Jurisdiction. See Is a UN International Criminal Court in
the US National Interest?: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Operations of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 76-79 (1998) (statement submitted by
Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch). As Universal Jurisdiction trials are very
unlikely, this fact will also probably not affect the behavior of states and their officers.
51 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, art. 9, supra note 32.
52 See ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of
Complementarity in Practice, at 14, ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA (Mar. 30,
2003).
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article's analysis thus proceeds on the assumption that sham trials
cannot regularly be exposed. Later in part IV other assumptions
are explored. Under primacy, the state may lack an incentive to
investigate or prosecute its officers and even if it does investigate
or prosecute, the ICC will still be able to assume jurisdiction. The
officers in the state may be deterred by the possibility of
prosecution by the ICC if it is likely enough. In corrupt states,
primacy therefore leads to either better or equal deterrence
compared with complementarity.
The analysis above suggests that complementarity leads to
better deterrence in rule of law states and primacy leads to better
deterrence in corrupt states. 53 Under the ICC's jurisdiction,
however, there are both rule of law states and corrupt states, and
the same jurisdictional rule applies to both types of states.54
Consideration of the probability of prosecution by the ICC,
however, would lead to a better rule. The probability of
prosecution of guilty officers by the ICC is limited, because the
resources of the ICC are finite. However, the paper starts from
the assumption that the ICC is unlikely to convict innocent
officers, either maliciously or by mistake. This article assumes
that officers are rational actors and would commit crimes only if
the probability of conviction multiplied by the punishment is
higher than the utility gained from the crime. 56 All officers are
assumed to gain the same utility from committing crimes such that
a low probability of prosecution by the ICC would not be enough
to deter them, but a high probability of prosecution would be a
sufficient deterrent. This article asserts that even a low probability
of prosecution by the ICC is enough to make a state investigate its
officers under complementarity, because that state could prosecute
its officer at a relatively low cost and avoid prosecution by the
ICC, which would cause the state significant reputational
53 See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 405. Maybe the reason for adopting
the rule of primacy in the ICTY was that it faced mainly corrupt judiciaries, creating a
constant fear of sham trials. Alternatively, it is possible that the reason for adopting
primacy in the ICTY is not the fear of losing deterrence, but rather the fear of a trial in
which the officers will receive a judgment that is biased against them and is therefore
excessively severe. See id.
54 See Simmons & Danner, supra note 38, at 238.
55 See Informal Expert Paper, supra note 52, at 14.
56 For a presentation of this model see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Economic Theory ofPublic Enforcement ofLaw, 38 J. EcoN. LIT. 45, 47-48 (2000).
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damage. 57 If the probability of prosecution by the ICC is
extremely low, states may not have an incentive to prosecute their
officers even under complementarity, since they would know that
the ICC would be unlikely to prosecute their officers. This
possibility is not addressed in this article.5 8
If the probability of prosecution by the ICC is low, under
complementarity, rule of law states will prosecute their officers
legitimately and their officers will be deterred. Under primacy,
rule of law states will not prosecute their officers. Officers will
face only a low probability of prosecution by the ICC and will not
be deterred. Under complementarity, corrupt states will try their
officers in sham trials and shield them from prosecution by the
57 In fact, if the probability of prosecution by the ICC is low, the reputational
damage for the state may be even higher than in the case of a high probability of
prosecution, since if only a few violations are prosecuted by the ICC, the salience of each
of them in the world public opinion may be higher, which will lead to a greater
reputational damage. Under the assumption that the marginal cost of prosecuting
officers, both by the ICC and by the state, is decreasing, the state may be even more
inclined to prosecute under the rule of complementarity if more of its officers are
committing crimes. The higher the number of officers committing crimes, the greater the
probability that the ICC prosecutor will decide to investigate the situation. Once the ICC
starts to investigate the situation, it may prosecute many of the officers involved in
crimes because the cost of each prosecution is lower than the first one. At the same time,
the state's costs of prosecution may decrease after it prosecutes the first several officers,
because internal political opposition to the prosecution will not continue to rise
significantly if more officers are prosecuted. Therefore, the more officers there are that
are committing crimes, the greater the state's incentive to prosecute all of them, under
complementarity, in order to prevent the ICC from prosecuting all of its officers.
Furthermore, when the ICC prosecutor makes a decision to initiate an investigation she
considers generally the prosecution of similar cases by the national legal system in order
to decide whether to admit the case despite the principle of complementarity. When a
decision regarding the admissibility of individual cases is made, however, only
proceedings against the same person and substantially the same conduct can prevent the
ICC from exercising jurisdiction under complementarity. This gives the state an added
incentive to prosecute officers under complementarity in the hope of preventing ICC
from investigating the situation. See Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya
against the decision of Pre-trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled "Decision on the
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute," Situation in the Republic of Kenya
(Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali) (ICC-01/09-02/11 IOA), Appeals Chamber, 30 August
2011 [hereinafter Kenya Judgment] § 38-39.
58 Several states, including the United States, refused to ratify the Rome Statute
despite strong international and internal pressures. This indicates that even in the ICC's
incipient years states feared that it would prosecute their officers at likelihood high
enough to affect their behavior. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Declarations and
Reservations.

N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG.

754

Vol. XL

ICC, their officers will not be deterred. Under primacy, corrupt
states will not prosecute their officers. Officers will face only a
low probability of prosecution by the ICC and will not be deterred.
Therefore, when the probability of prosecution is low,
complementarity will deter officers in rule of law states that will
not be deterred under primacy. Officers in corrupt states will not
be deterred under complementarity or under primacy.
If the probability of prosecution is high, under
complementarity, rule of law states will prosecute and try their
officers legitimately and their officers will be deterred. Under
primacy, rule of law states will not prosecute their officers. The
officers will face a high probability of prosecution by the ICC and
will be deterred. Under complementarity, corrupt states will try
their officers in sham trials and shield them from prosecution by
the ICC, and the officers will not be deterred. Under primacy,
corrupt states will not prosecute their officers (and even if they
will prosecute some officers this will not prevent the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction). In this instance, officers will be subject to
a high probability of prosecution by the ICC and will be deterred.
Therefore, when the probability of prosecution by the ICC is high,
in rule of law states, officers will be deterred regardless of the rule
chosen; in corrupt states, officers that were not deterred under
complementarity, will be deterred under primacy.
Table I summarizes the results of this sub-part:
Table 1: The PreferableJurisdictionalRule under Different
Conditions

Rule of law states
(Sham trials
impossible)

Low probability
of prosecution
Officers will be
deterred only
under
complementarity

Corrupt states
(Sham trials
possible)

High probability
of prosecution
Officers will be
deterred under
both rules
-

Officers will not Officers will be
be deterred under deterred only
any rule
under primacy

As can be seen from this table and from the analysis above,
when the probability of prosecution is low, complementarity leads
to better deterrence regardless of the possibility of sham trials
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within the states under the ICC's jurisdiction.
When the
probability of prosecution is high, primacy leads to better
deterrence regardless of the type of states under the ICC's
jurisdiction. This result has significant normative implications
discussed in part VI.
B. The Effects of the Rule on a Wide Distributionof Officers
The effects on deterrence mentioned in Table I apply only to
the officer whose gain from committing the crime is precisely
equal to the critical level for which a high probability of
prosecution is enough to deter him and a low probability of
prosecution is not enough to deter him. Different officers,
however, sometimes have different gains from crimes. Officers
that expect a high gain from the crime will not be deterred even by
a high probability of prosecution. Officers that expect a low gain
from the crime will be deterred, even under a low probability of
prosecution. This means, for instance, that in the upper right
rubric of Table I (sham trials impossible and high probability of
prosecution) there will still be officers committing crimes. As an
example, if an officer is about to face a certain and painful death
on the battlefield unless he commits a crime, he will probably not
be deterred even if the probability of prosecution by the ICC is
high, and he cannot be shielded from the ICC's jurisdiction.
When the gains from committing crimes differ significantly
among officers, the increased deterrence of some officers,
achieved by shifting to another jurisdictional rule, may come at the
cost of lowering the deterrence of other officers. If all officers
have the same gains from committing crimes, such a shift between
jurisdictional rules might have occurred without lowering the
deterrence of any officer. As an example, if all officers have the
same gains from committing crimes and the probability of
prosecution is high, then shifting from complementarity to
primacy will always increase deterrence. Officers in corrupt states
will be deterred only under primacy and not under
complementarity. Officers in rule of law states will be deterred
under both rules. However, some officers in rule of law states may
have a higher gain than others from the crime. These officers may
be deterred under complementarity, which leads to a certain
legitimate punishment, but not under primacy, which leads to a
high probability of punishment.
The ICC can assign different penalties depending on the
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circumstances.59 More severe crimes, or crimes that involve a
higher expected gain for the officer, may call for a greater
penalty.60 By adjusting the penalty to the type of crime, the
differences in the incentives of officers could be minimized and
the results reached in the last sub-part could be applicable to all
officers. The officer's gains from the crime may be unobservable,
however, leading to cases in which the ICC is unable to match a
deterring penalty to the officer. Even if the individual utility
function of the officer is known, the ICC may not be able to
change the penalty accordingly. The ICC may have to maintain
coherence with previous judgments in other cases or properly
serve the other purposes of criminal law besides maximizing
deterrence, such as a just retribution or the expressive function of
the penalty. Another problem faced by the ICC is that it deals with
extremely severe crimes, such as war crimes, that can result in
many years of imprisonment.61 Officers that are still not deterred
by these penalties must expect a high gain from committing the
crime. The ICC cannot increase the penalty beyond the maximum
possible, life imprisonment, to outweigh the officer's expected
gain.62 The wider the differences between the officers' gains from
committing crimes and the lower the ability of the ICC to match
penalties to each officer's gain from the crime, the less applicable
the conclusions of the last sub-part will be.
Besides differences in the expected gain from the crime,
officers may differ from each other in the utility loss they suffer
from punishment. For instance, some officers will suffer a greater
utility loss than others from imprisonment. Different officers may
be risk averse, risk neutral, or risk preferring regarding
63
imprisonment.6 3 Officers
may also be irrational. 64 The analysis in
this paper is based on a cost-benefit calculation undertaken by

See Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 78.
60 See id. at art. 77.
61 See About the Court, supra note II (indicating the cases the court prosecutes
include war crimes and crimes against humanity).
62 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77(1).
63 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 56 at 47.
64 See James F. Alexander, The InternationalCriminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predictingthe Court's Impact, 54 VILL. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (2009) (discussing
the possibility that officers subject to the ICC's jurisdiction may be particularly
irrational).
59
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rational officers. However, if officers are systematically biased,
then their behavior may not correspond with this analysis.
It is important to stress that officers may behave rationally in
accordance with this analysis even if they are unaware of this costbenefit calculation. Individual officers will probably not be aware
of the probability of prosecution by the ICC. They may not know
whether the ICC applies complementarity or primacy and whether
they serve a corrupt or a rule of law state. Lawyers, however,
often advise the senior officers in charge of setting rules of
engagement.
These senior officers learn from their lawyers
about the factors mentioned above, and have a personal and
professional interest to ensure that the soldiers and officers under
their command will not be prosecuted for war crimes, or at least
will not suffer severe penalties. 67 The senior officers shape the
behavior of the officers under their command with their
instructions and orders, in ways that direct their behavior to concur
with the rational calculations presented in this paper. For example,
under complementarity, a senior officer in a corrupt state may set
more lenient rules of engagement than an officer in a rule of law
state, because he knows his subordinates can be protected by sham
trials and will not be convicted for severe crimes by the national
legal system. Furthermore, while low-level officers may not be
aware of the legal rules that determine their chances of being

65 The growing field of behavioral law and economics investigates biases that may
affect irrational officers. Although people, and especially international criminals, may be
irrational, in order to justify forsaking the model based on rationality in favor of a more
nuanced model of criminal behavior, however, individuals must consistently digress
from rationality in a certain direction. Even if individuals do not always act rationally,
but their behavior is spread randomly around the pattern of rational behavior, then a
model that assumes rationality will have the best predictive power of all possible models.
Only if criminals present a certain consistent bias will an alternative model that takes this
bias into account lead to better predictions. If models have biases that cut both ways,
they cannot help to construct a more fruitful model of human behavior. See generally
Alan Schwartz, The Rationality Assumption in Consumer Law (unpublished draft on file
with author).
66 See Amichai Cohen, Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces:
The International Law Department and the Changing Nature of International
Humanitarian Law, 26 CONN. J. INT'L L. 367, 398 (2011) (arguing that operational legal
advisors help to internalize the norms of international humanitarian law in modem
armies).
67 See id. at 398-402 (discussing the development of the roles and duties of lawyers
in advising soldiers in the Israeli Defense Forces).
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prosecuted, they may form reasonable estimates of these chances
by reading newspapers, talking to each other, or learning from
their instructors during military training. Officers may not know
the overall probability of prosecution by the ICC, but they will
certainly hear if a soldier from their unit, and even from their
army, stands trial at the ICC. Accordingly, they will change their
behavior to avoid a similar fate. Once several officers change their
behavior, their colleagues will follow these new practices even if
these colleagues are unaware of the reasons for this change.
This section suggests that the ICC may change the penalty
according to the expected utility of the crime. If the ICC is able to
adjust penalties, it may also be able to implement penalties based
on the probability of prosecution in order to maximize deterrence.
If penalties are increased infinitely and officers weigh the gain
from a crime against the punishment multiplied by the probability
of the punishment, primacy will lead to complete deterrence even
with a low probability of prosecution. Penalties, however, cannot
be increased infinitely. They are capped by the maximum penalty
allowed by the Rome Statute.69 Changing penalties relative to the
probability of prosecution also raises the problem of trying to be
consistent with previous judgments. In addition, it is difficult to
manipulate the penalty due to other considerations of the ICC.
The ICC is more capable of assigning a different penalty to a
different crime than assigning a different penalty conditioned on
the probability of prosecution. It is a basic tenet of criminal law
that the severity of punishment is relative to the severity of the
committed crime. Crimes that are more severe often lead to a
greater advantage to the violator. In these instances, a higher
penalty for more severe crimes both promotes deterrence and
concurs with the consideration of retribution. For example, if
taking a person hostage leads to military gain, taking a hundred
hostages will probably lead to a greater gain. It seems completely
reasonable to punish the taking of a hundred hostages, a more
severe crime, with a higher penalty than the taking of one
hostage-both on grounds of deterrence and for reasons of

68 Cf Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 56, at 68 (discussing how individuals often
have only estimates or subjective knowledge and likely do not know the actual
probability and magnitude of sanctions).
69 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77 (containing the possible penalties
imposable under the statute, with life imprisonment being the maximum penalty).
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retribution. Conversely, increasing penalties based on the court's
overall probability of prosecution could potentially lead to
inconsistent decisions and to decisions that are unjustifiable under
other theories of criminal law. 70
IV. If the ICC Can Detect Sham Trials
Sham investigations can result in decisions not to prosecute
guilty officers, perpetual delays, false acquittals, or inappropriate
penalties. If the ICC cannot expose trials or investigations as
shams, then corrupt states will conduct sham investigations and
trials, as long as those proceedings are less costly than the
reputational cost of having their officers prosecuted before the ICC
multiplied by the probability of such prosecution. Rule of law
states will not use sham trials to shield their officers because of the
quality of their own legal system. The ICC may be unable to
detect sham trials for two reasons: the high information costs
needed to review the quality of a state's legal system and the cost
of antagonizing states and national courts by reviewing national
trials and investigations.
If the ICC reviews trials or
investigations by the state's judicial system, it impinges on the
state's sovereignty, which may reduce support for the ICC. Such
review may lead states to react against the ICC by, for instance,
cutting its budget, criticizing it, exiting the treaty regime, or
withholding ratification.7 2
Nevertheless, in certain instances, the ICC may be able to
review national investigations or trials and expose them as
fraudulent. A trial could be considered a sham for two possible
reasons-either because a state's national legal system is unable to
prosecute the offenses or because it is unwilling to do so. If a
state's national legal system is truly unable to carry out the

70 Cf Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 56, at 65 (discussing how settlements are
more common as the severity of the penalty increases and how such settlements may
produce undesirable results, such as being "not as well tailored as would be true of courtdetermined sanctions").
71 See id. at 1270-71.
72 See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in InternationalJudicialLawmaking, 45
VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 656-668 (2005) (analyzing the mechanisms states can use to
constrain the behavior of international courts); see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition
and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 411, 420-426 (2008)
(providing additional information on the mechanisms states can use to exercise control
over international courts).
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prosecution and the trial, adopting complementarity will not help
to ensure prosecution since the state cannot prosecute
adequately.7 3 It is also possible however, that the state's judicial
system is able to pursue the case adequately, but the state is
unwilling to adequately prosecute. For instance, the state may
wish to pressure its judiciary into conducting a sham trial with the
hope of shielding officers from the ICC. In such cases, the threat
of declaring the state as unwilling to prosecute the officers, and
therefore allowing the ICC to assume jurisdiction under
complementarity, may give the state an incentive to conduct a
legitimate trial.
If the ICC were consistently able to expose sham trials,
complementarity would increase the incentives of states that can
prosecute to investigate and prosecute guilty officers legitimately.
This is true for two reasons: first, because a legitimate
investigation and prosecution is the only way to prevent a decision
by the ICC that a state's officers committed crimes-a decision
that will damage the state's reputation. Second, only by a
legitimate investigation and prosecution can that state prevent a
declaration that it is unwilling to prosecute its officers genuinely.
Such a declaration can, by itself, damage the state's reputation.74
If the ICC exposes all sham trials, corrupt states and rule of
law states alike will not use sham trials. In this case, if the
probability of prosecution by the ICC is low, complementarity will
lead to better deterrence of officers than will primacy. Under
complementarity, even with a low probability of prosecution,
states will have an incentive to prosecute and will always do so
legitimately and deter their officers. Under primacy, officers will
not be deterred because the probability of prosecution is too low to
deter them and the states will not prosecute them. If the
probability of prosecution by the ICC is high, officers will be
deterred either under primacy (because of the prospect of
prosecution by the ICC) or under complementarity (because of the
prospect of prosecution by their national courts, prosecution that
will always be legitimate). Even if the probability of prosecution
is high, however, complementarity may be superior for other
reasons not discussed in this paper. For instance, complementarity
allocates the task of processing most cases to the national judicial
73
74

See Kleffner, supra note 7, at 321.
Id. at 320.
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systems, and thus lowers the burden on the ICC, while
strengthening the ability of national courts to act within their own
jurisdictions. If there is a credible threat by the ICC that all sham
trials will be exposed, then the actual costs of exposing sham trials
will not be borne by the ICC, since states will avoid using sham
trials in order to avoid the reputational damage caused by the
exposure of a trial as a sham. The ICC can threaten to expose all
sham trials, however, only when exposing sham trials is feasible in
terms of acquiring the necessary information and politically
practicability.
It is possible, and even likely, that the ICC can expose some
sham trials. Such investigations, however, would be costly for the
ICC, in terms of time, resources, and the ICC's support by the
states. If the ICC were better financed and better respected, it may
be better able to expose sham trials. Those factors, however, are
likely to cast an effect not only on the ICC's ability to expose
sham trials but also on its ability to prosecute crimes. If this is the
case, then an ineffective ICC will have a low probability of
prosecution and be unable to expose sham trials, while an effective
ICC will have a high probability of prosecution and be able to
expose sham trials. Under these conditions, complementarity
leads to better, or at least equal, deterrence than primacy regardless
of the ICC's effectiveness. If the ICC is ineffective in corrupt
states, officers will not be deterred regardless of the rule chosen.
However, in rule of law states that will not attempt sham trials
because of the constraints of their own legal systems,
complementarity will give the states an incentive to prosecute and
will therefore lead to better deterrence of officers. If the ICC is
effective, officers will be deterred regardless of the rule and of the
type of the state. If complementarity is adopted, corrupt states will
try their officers in legitimate trials because they fear exposure by
the ICC. If they attempt a sham trial or fail to prosecute, the ICC
will also assume jurisdiction so officers will always be deterred.
In rule of law states, officers will be deterred because the state will
prosecute them legitimately. If primacy is adopted, both types of
states will not prosecute their officers, but officers will be deterred
by the high probability of prosecution by the ICC.

75 Complementarity can also give states an incentive to make their national criminal
legislation compatible with the provisions of the Rome Statute and thus make national
proceedings prevent the ICC from assuming jurisdiction. See id. at 332-38.
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Complementarity will therefore lead to similar deterrence as
primacy for an effective ICC. However, complementarity will
lead to efficiency and will promote cooperation with national
courts.
Primacy may lead to better deterrence compared with
complementarity only if the ICC can expose only some of the
sham trials. Additionally, the reputational damage caused to the
state from exposure of a sham trial multiplied by the probability of
exposure must be low enough that corrupt states will still use sham
trials. In that case, there may be lower deterrence under
complementarity, because under complementarity corrupt states
will use sham trials to shield their officers from the ICC.
It is possible that the ICC has a limited set of resources, both in
terms of judicial time and the goodwill of states. If the ICC were
to expose a sham trial, the investigation would require more
resources than a typical prosecution. The ICC has to decide how
to use its resources, either to prosecute cases that were not
prosecuted by the states or to expose sham trials used for shielding
guilty parties. If the ICC doesn't have any motive other than
improving deterrence of crimes in the present,7 6 then it will choose
the optimal mix of actions-prosecuting new cases and exposing
sham trials available under the rule chosen. Therefore, from an
organizational perspective, it is important to choose the rule that
will lead to the best optimal mix of actions.
Under complementarity, the ICC will spend some of its
resources on exposing sham trials. Officers will be deterred if the
probability of prosecution by the ICC is high enough to motivate
states to prosecute (the cost to the state of prosecuting the officer
domestically is lower than the reputational damage caused to the
state by conviction of the officer by the ICC multiplied by the
probability of such conviction), and at the same time, the
probability of exposing sham trials is high enough to motivate
76 Even if the ICC's only purpose is to maximize deterrence in the maximum
number of cases, and even if the ICC will remain completely true to its purpose, it may
act strategically to improve its ability to deter crimes in the future, even if this means
losing deterrence in the present. If the ICC uses such a long term strategy, it may, for
instance, avoid antagonizing states that can control its future budget or whose
cooperation it seeks, by refraining from prosecuting their officers. This will damage
deterrence in some cases but will allow the court to increase its resources and to better
deter violations in the future. Adopting the assumption of a long-term strategy by the
ICC, however, will complicate the analysis unnecessarily.
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states to conduct legitimate trials (the marginal benefit the state
earns from holding a sham trial, instead of holding a legitimate
trial, must be lower than the damage caused to the state by
exposure of a sham trial multiplied by the probability of such
exposure). Under primacy, the ICC will spend all of its resources
prosecuting officers, since states are unlikely to prosecute their
own officers at all in cases in which it runs against their internal
interests to do so. Under this rule, the only thing that can deter
officers is the prospect of trial by the ICC. Officers will only be
deterred if the probability of prosecution by the ICC is high.
The amount of resources needed to achieve deterrence under
both rules depends on the types of states that are under the ICC's
jurisdiction. If there are only rule of law states under the ICC's
jurisdiction, the cost of exposing sham trials is zero, since none
will be attempted. Therefore, under complementarity, the court
needs only to reach a low probability of prosecution to achieve
deterrence of officers. Conversely, in order to deter officers under
primacy, the ICC must have a high probability of prosecution. If
there are only corrupt states under the ICC's jurisdiction, or if
corrupt states form a significant portion of the states under the
ICC's jurisdiction, then only the threat of exposure of the trial as a
sham by the ICC can prevent the corrupt states from using sham
trials. It is unclear if deterrence is more likely under primacy,
when the ICC needs to reach a high probability of prosecution, or
under complementarity, when the ICC needs to reach both a
probability of prosecution that gives states an incentive to
prosecute and a probability of exposure that gives the state an
incentive not to use sham trials. The result will depend on the
numbers of corrupt states and rule of law states under the ICC's
jurisdiction and the numbers of potential criminals in these states
as well as the costs of prosecuting cases and the costs of exposing
sham trials. Results will also depend on the reputational sanction
the state expects from having its officers prosecuted at the ICC,
and the reputational sanction the state expects from the exposure
of sham trials conducted by its national court.n Therefore, if the
77 Further considerations can also change the result. For instance, states may be
able to affect the probability of prosecution by the ICC by hiding evidence or by
preventing media coverage. The willingness of states to engage in behavior that lowers
the probability of prosecution may correlate with their willingness to use sham trials.
Therefore, if the ICC deals with corrupt states that are also very good at hiding
information, making prosecution by the ICC difficult, the ICC may save costs by
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ICC is able to expose sham trials, but doing so is costly and lowers
the court's ability to prosecute new cases, then the preferred legal
rule is unknown.
V. Normative Solutions
Assuming that the ICC cannot detect sham trials and that the
probability of ICC prosecution is low, and assuming all officers
gain the same utility from crimes, it follows that officers in rule of
law states will be deterred under complementarity and not under
primacy, while officers in corrupt states will not be deterred under
either rule. If the probability of prosecution by the ICC is high,
officers in rule of law states will be deterred under both rules,
while officers in corrupt states will be deterred under primacy and
not under complementarity. This part seeks to build on these
insights and suggest normative solutions to maximize the
deterrence of officers from committing crimes contrary to the
Rome Statute.
A. Changingthe Rome Statute In the Future
The Rome Statute can be amended and the jurisdictional rule
can be adapted to changing conditions. Seven years after its entry
into force, any state party may propose amendments to the Rome

adopting a rule of primacy and obviating the need to expose sham trials. At the same
time, the ICC may incur even greater costs in order to maintain a high probability of
prosecution, which is necessary to deter officers under the rule of primacy.
The ICC may be able to expose sham trials but err in some of its decisions,
viewing sham trials as legitimate, or legitimate trials as shams. After a trial is completed
under a rule of primacy, the ICC can still expose this trial as a sham. See Heller, supra
note 35. Both rule of law states and corrupt states will conduct trials of some officers for
internal reasons regardless of the jurisdictional rule adopted, but a rule of
complementarity gives corrupt states an interest to conduct sham trials when, under a
rule of primacy, they would not conduct a trial at all. Rule of law states will also conduct
legitimate trials under complementarity where under a rule of primacy they will not
conduct a trial. A greater number of sham trials make the ICC more likely to treat a
legitimate trial as a sham because it is more suspicious of all trials. This argument draws
on Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: a Game
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REv. 430, 431 (2000)
(showing that without the right to silence, more guilty suspects will choose to give a false
exculpatory statement, which will make judges discount all uncorroborated exculpatory
statements, including those made by innocent suspects). Increasing the number of trials,
and sham trials especially, may also make the ICC more likely not to expose sham trials
as a sham simply because it has fewer available resources to expose all sham trials.
78 See supra Part III A.
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Statute. 79 Then, the Assembly of State Parties can consider the
80
amendment and accept it with a two-thirds majority.o
A
amendment shall enter into force for all state parties one year after
seven-eighths of the state parties deposit instruments of ratification
or acceptance. 81
The drafters of the Rome Statute rightly adopted
complementarity since the ICC is expected to have a low
probability of prosecution in the first years of its existence. In the
future, if the state parties observe that the there is a high
probability of prosecution by the ICC, they may amend the statute
and replace complementarity with primacy. This strategy will
maximize deterrence. Amending the Rome Statute may be
difficult, however, especially if some state parties object to it.
B. ChangingDoctrine by the ICC's Judgments
The basic jurisdictional rule applied by the ICC is determined
by the Rome Statute.83 Amendment of the statute can be
politically difficult and may be hindered by the interests of the
state parties.84 Nevertheless, the ICC may be able to use its
judicial discretion to shape the jurisdictional rule it applies by
changing the interpretation of the jurisdictional rule set in the
statute. The rule of complementarity is not clear-cut and precise.
It prevents the ICC from assuming jurisdiction only if the case is
investigated or prosecuted or if it was investigated and the state
decided not to prosecute. Complementarity also allows the ICC to
assume jurisdiction when the state is "unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."" This
test uses vague and ambiguous language that allows the ICC
substantial judicial discretion. The ICC can use its discretion to
shape complementarity in order to maximize deterrence. For
instance, if the probability of prosecution increases over the years,

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 121.
so Id.
81 This does not include amendments that deal with purely institutional issues, id.
at art. 122, or with the definition of crimes, id. at art. 121 § 5.
82 See Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 661 (discussing the difficulty and political nature
of the amendment process in international agreements).
83 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 1.
84 See Ginsburg, supra note 70, at 661.
85 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17 § 1(a).
79

N.C. J.INTL L. &COM. REG.

766

Vol. XL

the ICC can employ an increasingly stringent standard when it
determines the legitimacy of state-initiated investigations or
prosecutions that could prevent the ICC from assuming
jurisdiction. This will allow the ICC to shift by methods of
interpretation from complementarity to a rule that, in effect,
resembles primacy.
It could be difficult for the ICC to expose an investigation or
prosecution as a sham because information about the quality of the
investigation or prosecution may be unavailable, or a state might
be resistant to a ruling that its legal system is not functioning
legitimately.
The ICC can minimize these difficulties by
determining that the state's actions did not qualify as an
investigation because it failed to meet certain standards, and
thereby avoid branding investigations as shams. The ICC can set
clear requirements for any state action to qualify as an
investigation for the sake of preventing the ICC from assuming
jurisdiction under complementarity. For example, in a recent
decision, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC ruled that only taking
steps, such as "interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting
documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses" to
ascertain whether the suspect is responsible for the same conduct
alleged before the ICC can qualify as an investigation." If the
state is only prepared to take these steps, or if it takes them against
other suspects, this will not constitute an investigation. The ICC
states clearly that the decision regarding the existence of an
investigation is separate and distinct from the decision about
whether an existing investigation is legitimate.
The ICC
followed this doctrine in a decision issued on December 7, 2012,
regarding the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. 8 In this
decision, the ICC ruled that the state bears the burden to prove it is
conducting an investigation.89 The ICC went on to demand
information about the intricate details of the proceedings in Libya,
the investigations conducted, and Libyan law.9 When the ICC
See Kenya Judgment, supra note 57, at 3.
See id. at 15.
88 See Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No. ICC01 / 11-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision Requesting Further Submissions on Issues
Related to the Admissibility of the Case Against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 5-6 (Dec. 7,
2012).
89 Id. at 5.
86
87

9o

Id. at 7-19.
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sets a high threshold for any investigation that can prevent it from
taking the case, it not only prevents sham trials that can fail to
deter officers, it also prevents trials that can damage the basic due
process rights of the accused, as was probably the ICC's concern in
the case of Gaddafi. Future decisions can further clarify the
guidelines for what constitutes an investigation. Clear guidelines
can help thwart accusations of bias and also lower the information
costs needed to determine if an investigation took place. If the
probability of prosecution increases in the future, the ICC can
issue increasingly stringent standards.
This will move the
jurisdictional rule closer to primacy.
C. A Two Tiered Treaty System
There is a possibility that different rules can apply to different
states at the same time. Instead of drafting just one treaty thai
applies to all states, the states can agree to adopt a separate
protocol that some states can decide to opt into. While the basic
treaty can apply complementarity, the separate protocol can apply
primacy on the states that choose to join it. If proper incentives
are given to each state to choose the protocol that maximizes
deterrence within it, overall deterrence will be maximized.
In order to maximize deterrence, rule of law states must be
motivated to join only the basic treaty with complementarity,
while corrupt states must be motivated to join the protocol that
applies primacy. If the main treaty and the protocol are identical
in every respect besides the jurisdictional rule, states will opt into
the treaty that applies the jurisdictional rule that suits their
interests. If the reason states decide to join the ICC's urisdiction
is to enhance their commitment not to commit crimes, states will
opt into the treaty that maximizes deterrence of their officers. If
rule of law states cannot commit without the ICC to investigate all
crimes committed by their officers, they will adopt only the
complementarity treaty and their officers will be deterred. Corrupt
states will opt into the primacy protocol, and if the probability of
prosecution is high, their officers will be deterred.
If states do not join the ICC's jurisdiction primarily to enhance
their commitment not to commit crimes, states will not
deliberately try to maximize deterrence by opting into the proper
protocol. If corrupt states and rule of law states have different
91 See Simmons & Danner, supra note 38, at 234.
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interests, however, the different protocols could be structured so as
to give each type of state the incentive to join the protocol that
maximizes deterrence within it. For instance, corrupt states may
also be states with bad human rights practices. Such states,
according to some scholars, gain a more favorable reputation by
joining human rights regimes. 2 In that case, the separate protocol
adopting primacy can be presented as a different and more
stringent treaty regime. This will give corrupt states with bad
practices a greater incentive to ratify this protocol and gain a better
reputation as a result.9 3 Since primacy infringes more on the
state's sovereignty than does complementarity, it is easy to present
the primacy protocol as an additional and more stringent treaty
obligation even without any other substantial differences between
the protocols. Alternatively, the separate protocol that adopts
primacy can deliberately include other provisions that are more
beneficial for corrupt states than for rule of law states. These other
provisions may deal with other issues besides the jurisdictional
rules, and they can be bundled together with the primacy rule in
order to give corrupt states an incentive to opt into the protocol.
The ICC can start with the two tiered system when the
probability of prosecution is low and try to give the states the
incentive to sort themselves out into the proper protocol that
maximizes deterrence for their officers-a complementarity
protocol for rule of law states and a primacy protocol for corrupt
states. If the probability of prosecution later becomes high, and
some corrupt states fail to join the primacy protocol, it may be
beneficial to amend the Rome Statute and apply primacy to all
state parties. It may be easier to change the Rome Statute into one
unitary system that adopts primacy if a separate primacy protocol
was adopted previously and joined by many states. As more states
join the separate primacy protocol, there will be increased pressure
on other states to join this protocol, or to agree to amend the Rome
Statute and apply primacy to all states.
92 See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of
InternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 510-11 (2005).
93 If mostly corrupt states join the primacy protocol, however, states may fear that
their accession to the protocol signals that they are corrupt states. If states wish to avoid
being signaled out as corrupt states, this may affect their behavior and make them less
willing to join the primacy protocol. The phrasing of the protocol must try to counter
this effect by stressing the commitment of the states that ratify it to protecting human
rights and to ending impunity for international crimes.
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D. UsingJudicialDiscretion to Distinguish Between States
The above analysis applies only if. the ICC is unable to
distinguish between corrupt states and rule of law states or is
unable to treat them differently. If the ICC is able to identify the
types of states and shift resources to the prosecution of crimes in
certain types of states, it may reach different probabilities of
prosecution in different types of states. The ICC may, for
instance, achieve a high probability of prosecution in corrupt states
and a low probability of prosecution in rule of law states. Under
these conditions, if complementarity is adopted, officers will not
be deterred in the corrupt states because they can be shielded from
the ICC by national sham trials. If primacy is adopted, officers
will not be deterred in rule of law states because they will not be
prosecuted by their own states, and the probability of their
prosecution by the ICC will be low. Alternatively, the ICC may
achieve a high probability of prosecution in rule of law states and a
low probability of prosecution in corrupt states. In that case, if
complementarity is adopted, officers will not be deterred in the
corrupt states because they will be shielded by sham trials. If
primacy is adopted, officers in corrupt states will not be deterred
because they face a low probability of prosecution by the ICC.
Therefore, applying a different probability of prosecution to rule of
law states and to corrupt states cannot ensure deterrence across all
states.
The ICC may be able to distinguish between the types of states
and apply different jurisdictional rules to each type by methods of
interpretation. The ICC can theoretically apply complementarity
and demand only minimal national investigations in order to
prevent it from assuming jurisdiction from rule of law states and
apply a much more stringent standard to investigations conducted
in corrupt states. In that case, deterrence will be maximized, since
the ICC will, in effect, employ complementarity on rule of law
states and a rule similar to primacy on corrupt states. The
application of different jurisdictional rules to different types of
states, however, can seriously damage the ICC's impartial image.
If the ICC openly applies different rules to different states, it will
be faced with resistance from the states that are damaged by this
differentiation, and the ICC's legitimacy will be jeopardized. To
avoid allegations of bias, the ICC will have to use ambiguous legal
reasoning that can hide its true motives, but such reasoning could
also damage its legitimacy by lowering the predictability and the
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persuasiveness of the ICC's judgments.
VI. Conclusion
This article investigates which jurisdictional rulecomplementarity or primacy-can maximize deterrence of officers
from committing the crimes listed in the Rome Statute. The article
suggests that the type of states under the ICC's jurisdiction, as
well as the probability of the prosecution by the ICC, can
determine which rule maximizes deterrence. The article also
offers several normative solutions that try to maximize deterrence
by the ICC through matching different rules to different
conditions. Even if the ICC's purpose is only to improve
deterrence, however, maximizing deterrence of certain types of
crimes, or of crimes committed in certain types of states, may be
viewed as more important than deterring other crimes. This may
lead to different normative recommendations. The ICC may also
be forced to act strategically to ensure its effectiveness over time
and in doing so may have to compromise deterrence in certain
cases. As an example, the ICC can favor states that can damage its
budget or prestige and refrain from prosecuting their officers. A
more complex program for institutional design of the ICC will
have to take into account possible strategic behavior by the ICC, as
well as the possibility that the ICC will follow other motivations
that are inconsistent with its purpose.
Another important
consideration is the effect that the adopted jurisdictional rule will
have on states' decisions to join the ICC's jurisdiction by ratifying
the Rome Statute. These issues are not discussed in this paper.
Furthermore, deterrence of any kind may not even be the most
important purpose of the ICC. Other possible purposes may
include retribution-justly penalizing war criminals, an expressive
educational function, or paving the way for future international
cooperation. All of these purposes involve different normative
considerations that are not discussed in this paper. The normative
solutions offered in this paper should affect the choice of the
jurisdictional rules for the ICC only to the extent that maximizing
deterrence is viewed as an important purpose of the ICC.

